A Proposal to Resolve Interbranch Disputes on the Practice Field by Verkuil, Paul R.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1991
A Proposal to Resolve Interbranch Disputes on the
Practice Field
Paul R. Verkuil
Copyright c 1991 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Verkuil, Paul R., "A Proposal to Resolve Interbranch Disputes on the Practice Field" (1991). Faculty Publications. Paper 1025.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1025
THE POPE JOHN XXIII LECTURE* 
A PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE INTERBRANCH 
DISPUTES ON THE PRACTICE FIELD 
Paul R. Verkuil** 
Separation of powers and checks and balances are ritualistic phrases in 
our constitutional system that hardly need extended explanation. Suffice it 
to say we are not a government of separate powers but of shared powers. 
The model James Madison principally devised had more in common with 
the mixed English system of John Locke than the strict French separation 
model inspired by Montesquieu. 1 Intentionally, our three branches each 
have offices in the other. The presidential veto of legislation, the senatorial 
advise and consent function over executive appointments, and the split 
power to conduct and declare war are only three of the most obvious (and 
fundamental) examples of our system of shared powers. 
Sharing power, nevertheless, does not make the resolution of interbranch 
disputes easier. As Chief Justice Burger observed in INS v. Chadha,2 our 
constitutional arrangements were not designed necessarily to be easy or even 
efficient-they were designed to secure liberty. Moreover, in this modem 
era of divided government, where the executive and legislative branches are 
controlled by different parties, 3 the possibilities of friction and impasse are 
• This Article is adapted from the annual Pope John XXIII Lecture delivered on April 
2, 1991, at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. The date is of 
critical importance as it speaks from the time just after the Gulf conflict when there was 
greater optimism in the relationship between the White House and Congress. Since the Justice 
Thomas confirmation hearings, however, that optimism may be misplaced. See Bush Launches 
Strike at Congress: President Calls Lawmakers "Privileged Class of Rulers", WASH. PoST, Oct. 
25, 1991, at l. 
•• President and Professor of Law and Government, The College of William and Mary. 
l. See generally LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS POWER AND POLICY 1-27 
(1972) (discussing the origins and history of separated powers from the French models and the 
Articles of Confederation to the Constitutional Convention and its subsequent ratification); 
Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. 
& MARY L. REv. 301, 305 (1989) ("[T]he English constitutionalism ... forms the backdrop to 
our own constitutional experience."). 
2. 462 u.s. 919, 944 (1983). 
3. Lloyd Cutler summarized the situation well: 
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heightened. Suggestions are even made these days that the parliamentary 
system, with its built-in protections against political division, might be a 
more sensible way to organize our own system. 4 
Today, we stand at a remarkable juncture in our history of interbranch 
relations. Having recently concluded a military engagement that for the first 
time since World War II involved reasoned debate and action by both polit-
ical branches, the conditions for a meaningful exchange of views about sepa-
ration of powers could not be better. One cannot read the extensive debates 
in the House and Senate on the resolution to authorize the President to enter 
into a military conflict in the Gulf without perceiving a strong sense of 
shared purpose and mutual respect. 5 Even those who voted not to grant the 
President the power to engage in the conflict united in an admirable sense of 
mutual purpose. Senator Gore aptly described the importance of this shared 
feeling when he said that "[n]ational consensus is a strategic asset."6 While 
this kind of unity is often limited to international relations, this impressive 
display of interbranch cooperation may result in a better understanding of 
domestic matters and, specifically, the subject of interbranch relations. For 
these reasons, there is a higher level of mutual respect and trust between 
Capitol Hill and the White House than there has been in many years. 7 The 
timing, therefore, could not be better to urge interbranch cooperation and 
understanding concerning those internecine domestic disputes that often 
frustrate a mutually productive relationship between the branches. Cer-
tainly the recent struggle between the White House and the Senate over the 
confirmation of Clarence Thomas to a position on the Supreme Court high-
lights the gulf in communications that still exists. But it also demonstrates 
how much the branches need to work more closely on appointment matters. 
For the first 150 years, the party system had remarkable success in fostering coop-
eration between the branches. In thirty-five of thirty-eight elections from 1796 to 
1948, the party winning the White House also won the majority of both the House 
and the Senate. Taylor, Hayes, and Cleveland, I think, in his second term, were the 
only exceptions. Now, of course, the opposite happens. Beginning in 1956, in six out 
of nine Presidential elections we ended up with divided government. Beginning in 
1968, in five out of the last six Presidential elections, twenty of the last twenty-four 
years projected forward to 1992, we have had divided government. 
Lloyd Cutler, What Is Wrong with Divided Government?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 563, 565 (1990). 
4. /d. 
5. See H.R.J. Res. 62, l02d Cong., lst Sess. (1991). See generally MICHAEL J. GLEN-
NON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990) (discussing the branches's respective constitu-
tional roles in foreign policymaking). 
6. 136 CONG. REC. Sl6,755 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Gore). 
7. There is no way to "prove" this proposition, but the President's address to an admir-
ing Congress on March 6, 1991, makes it hard to rebut. Jack Sirica & Gaylord Shaw, Star of 
the Show; Applause for Bush in Congress, NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 1991, at 3. 
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There are two essential questions to be asked: First, what is the legal basis 
of separation of powers disputes? Are they necessary as a constitutional mat-
ter, ingrained, if you will, in tensions built into the Constitution itself, or are 
they discretionary or avoidable by better communications between8 the 
branches? Second, what mechanisms or forums are available to help achieve 
a working understanding of when and how these disputes can be avoided? 
This Article proposes an analysis of the first question and a prescription for 
the second. 
I. NECESSARY INTERBRANCH CONFRONTATIONS 
There can be no argument that the large issues of governance are meant to 
trigger friction and confrontation. The Framers, as Madison said, 9 inten-
tionally set out to protect the liberties of the people by limiting government. 
Thus, debate over such basic matters as the proper roles in declaring and 
coordinating war will never end; nor should conflict over the budget and 
spending authority. 10 In addition, many appointments and advise and con-
sent questions are also within territory set aside for perpetual dispute. There 
was, for example, practically no way to avoid the confrontation that resulted 
from the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. That was an 
ideological debate; it served to redefine, for better or worse, the future role of 
the Senate in the advise and consent function. 11 
Likewise, there are times when the President and Congress must end up in 
court. When President Truman seized the steel mills to maintain production 
in the midst of a labor dispute during the Korean conflict, he challenged 
congressional authority in a way that forced confrontation with the industry 
itself. 12 In United States v. Nixon, 13 the Court was the only institution able 
to resolve the question whether the assertion of executive privilege by Presi-
dent Nixon could prevail over a judicial claim for presidential documents. 
But other cases, such as the legislative veto case, INS v. Chadha, 14 are less 
8. "Between" because it is the two political branches, not the judicial branch, that pose 
most of the separation of powers challenges. Of course it is also possible that the judiciary's 
interest on occasion can be involved. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding that Congress's grant of specific adjudicatory au-
thority to bankruptcy judges violated Article III of the Constitution). 
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). 
10. See generally LoUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 255-75 (1990). 
11. See generally ROBERT H. DORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 267-349 (1990) (detail-
ing the politicalization of Robert Bork's confirmation process from the victim's perspective). 
Ironically the Clarence Thomas nomination battle, while certainly disputatious, had less to do 
with ideology than character issues and how they should be addressed. 
12. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
13. 418 u.s. 683 (1974). 
14. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
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than inevitable. Admittedly, Chadha dealt with explicit constitutional pro-
visions-the bicameralism and presentment clauses of Article I-that presi-
dents have a constitutional duty to preserve. Politics had made the 
legislative veto an accepted practice for many years and the political accom-
modation the device signified simply evaporated when it was extended into 
new areas, ·such as rulemaking review. 15 That the legislative veto continues 
to be employed by Congress in spending matters without presidential (or 
legal) challenge suggests that it is not totally without redeeming value. 
Other recent separation of powers cases are even more dubious when 
placed on the scale of "necessary" judicial challenges. Bowsher v. Synar 16 
and Morrison v. Olson, 17 the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and independ-
ent counsel cases, respectively, were major constitutional challenges that 
might have been avoided by better negotiations between the branches. Inter-
branch clashes must happen only in situations where important constitu-
tional responsibilities are expressly delegated and no compromise is 
contemplated by the political branches. Many other situations currently ex-
ist where clashes occur as if between enemies at night, with no real purpose 
or necessity, and with corrosive consequences for national consensus. These 
are the clashes that should be, at least as an initial matter, the focus of infor-
mal negotiation and resolution rather than judicial decree, because the polit-
ical branches themselves have an obligation to interpret the Constitution and 
not leave that task solely to the courts. 18 
II. A VOIDABLE INTERBRANCH CONFRONTATIONS 
There are many situations where conflict could be avoided if the political 
branches would confer and compromise. There are several examples that 
establish this proposition. The first involves a frequent source of conflict-
the production of documents by the executive branch to Congress. There is, 
at one level, no more routine practice than the sharing of information be-
1 S. It was only when the congressional use of the legislative veto extended to oversight of 
policymaking and rulemaking that the practice became intolerable from the executive branch's 
perspective. 
16. 478 u.s. 714 (1986). 
17. 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
18. A recent article emphasizes this point: 
Excessive reliance upon the Court deceives us into thinking that these disputes are 
purely constitutional in nature and that only the Justices can resolve them. Demand-
ing judicial resolution improperly diminishes the role of the political branches in 
interpreting the Constitution; emphasizing the constitutionality of a proposal diverts 
attention from its often dubious wisdom. 
Jonathan L. Entin, Congress, the President, and the Separation of Powers: Rethinking the 
Value of Litigation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 33 (1991). 
1991] lnterbranch Disputes 843 
tween executive officials and congressional committees. Both branches have 
strong interests in the process; Congress to perform its oversight function 
and the Executive to ensure that it can perform its constitutionally assigned 
tasks. Nevertheless, much occurs through accepted protocols of exchange, 
even though document production and protection is a deeply political pro-
cess that raises delicate issues of interbranch relations. 
The contested cases frequently pit assertions of executive privilege against 
congressional demands that may involve subpoenas and contempt cita-
tions.19 Indeed, the most famous recent contempt case against Assistant At-
torney General Theodore Olson ended up testing the constitutionality of the 
independent counsel mechanism.2° In this case, however, and many others, 
it is fair to question whether the confrontation was necessary at all. Would 
better negotiating procedures between Congress and the Executive have re-
duced the necessary confrontations between the branches on the issue of 
document production? An insightful study recently undertaken by the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States21 suggests that there are better 
ways than litigation to resolve many of these disputes. The report advocates 
a set of congressional rules and an Executive order that requires negotiation 
on document production issues. The purpose of this negotiation is to 
achieve compromise and to provide a mechanism for systematic recordkeep-
ing about such disputes to help shape the future resolution of similar claims. 
The overriding need is to create an atmosphere of trust that is often lacking 
between the branches in these types of negotiations. Indeed, as part of its 
solution, the report even suggests that neutral third party facilitators, retired 
federal judges and the like, might offer an alternative means of resolving 
disputes and establishing trust between the branches. 22 
Another recurring set of clashes that might be avoided centers on legisla-
tive additions (called limitations riders) to appropriation bills. Omnibus leg-
islation with unrelated riders passed at the end of an appropriations cycle 
19. See Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: 
The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987); see 
also Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a Prompt 
and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive 
Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71 (1986) (advocating the use of a special prosecutor to 
resolve conflicts in which the legislative demands for information are disobeyed by the execu-
tive branch). 
20. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
21. PETER M. SHANE, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATING FOR 
KNOWLEDGE: ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL DEMANDS FOR INFORMA-
TION 41 (1990). 
22. Id. at 37; see also Shane, supra note 19, at 529-39 (referring to earlier ABA efforts). 
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may render the President's veto too powerful to exercise. 23 But even if, as 
Neal Devins has shown,24 it is debatable whether the President is truly de-
prived of his veto power in such circumstances, there are sound reasons not 
to push policymaking to the last moments of the legislative cycle. 
Moreover, some of these additions to appropriation bills often read like a 
form of interbranch harassment. Former Attorney General Richard Thorn-
burgh highlighted several substantive provisions inserted in an allegedly 
veto-proof appropriation bill for which a valid legislative purpose was hard 
to divine.2s For example, in the 1989 appropriation for the Department of 
the Interior, the following language appears: "None of the funds available 
under this title may be used to prepare reports on contacts between employ-
ees of the Department of the Interior and Members and Committees of Con-
gress and their staff. "26 The point of this legislation was apparently to 
prevent the Secretary of the Interior, a cabinet official, from keeping track of 
what his own employees were saying to congressional leaders or probing into 
any charges of undue influence by interested members of Congress in execu-
tive decisions. 27 While this action failed, it occupied more time than it 
should have to resolve. 28 The whole idea of destabilizing the Executive by 
encouraging bureaucratic leaks to Congress is unjustifiable. One wonders 
how organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which 
recently urged executive branch employees to leak information about the 
Gulf War to Congress, can square its actions with legitimate executive 
branch needs to protect national security. 29 
23. See Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations On the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REv. 
403, 406-07 (1988). Contra Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the 
Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L. J. 389, 412-14 [hereinafter Devins, A 
Critical Look]. Of course the whole question of whether the item veto is itself a good idea (or 
indeed whether it now exists) is a subject worthy of interbranch discussion. See generally Neal 
E. Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 993 (1990). 
24. Devins, A Critical Look, supra note 23, at 412-14. 
25. Dick Thornburgh, The Separation of Powers: An Exemplar of the Rule of Law, 
Opening Address Before the Federalist Society Conference Symposium (Jan. 19-20, 1990), in 
68 WASH. U. L.Q. 485 (1990). 
26. Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 701, 722. 
27. Thornburgh, supra note 25, at 490. 
28. The aftermath of the Interior incident is instructive. The White House Counsel's of-
fice advised Congress that its provision was an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power. 
After this, Congress amended the provision to limit its effective date to one day-October 1, 
1989. As that day had already passed, no Interior contacts were required to be logged. See 
Symposium, Panel IlL Congressional Control of the Administration of Government: Hearings, 
Investigations, Oversight, and Legislative History, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 595, 598, 603 ( 1990). Few 
would dispute that this pointless exercise should have been avoided. 
29. The ACLU proclaimed before the Gulf War that lower level officials "'have a legal 
right and a political responsibility' " to leak in order " 'to ensure that Congress has the infor-
mation it needs to perform its constitutional duties.'" Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Whistle-Blowing. 
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With regard to the Interior incident, Attorney General Thornburgh con-
cluded that "[s]uch provisions obviously represent petty politics at their 
most base."30 That is a proposition with which it is hard to disagree; how-
ever, the larger question is more central. Why had the relationship of trust 
fallen to a level where such responses were forthcoming? Had the break-
down in communications between the branches reached the point where it 
had to be fought out in legislative skirmishing? This kind of non-productive 
exchange speaks eloquently to the need to create a forum for meeting and 
conferring, in which interbranch guerilla warfare over the loyalty of govern-
ment employees can be avoided. An ongoing dialogue between the main 
players in a neutral setting where give and take is possible is certainly prefer-
able to this public embarrassment. 
Another situation where dialogue might be beneficial concerns the ques-
tion of executive branch control of the agencies through the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) and the related question of agency 
organization, independent versus executive. During the last three adminis-
trations, attempts have been made to centralize and control the policymak-
ing functions of the agencies through OMB's Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs. This control has been achieved through a succession of 
Executive Orders31 that have challenged congressional assumptions about 
dictating agency policy and priorities through legislation, especially in re-
gard to the so-called independent agencies. Over time, there have been ac-
commodations on both sides that have modified the procedures whereby 
OMB policy control is exercised and, at the same time, have forestalled re-
strictive legislation that would have frustrated the Executive's need to cen-
tralize policymaking.32 Nonetheless, tensions continue in this area that 
could be reduced by informal communication and understanding. 
The continuing issue of how best to organize agencies to perform their 
missions is also one worth discussing in a neutral setting. Traditionally, 
Congress has looked to independent commissions as a mechanism for assert-
ing more control. 33 But it is becoming increasingly clear that the Executive 
ACLU-Sty/e, WASH. PoST, Dec. 30, 1990, at C7 (quoting advertising issued by the ACLU). In 
this one-sided world one wonders about such other valid constitutional duties as the Presi-
dent's responsibility to ensure the national security. 
30. Thornburgh, supra note 25, at 490. 
31. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 
127 (1981). 
32. See, e.g., S. 1080, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 127 CoNG. REc. 7938-41 
(1981). 
33. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 257 (explaining the potential and limitations of the independent agency as a vehicle for 
making government decisions). 
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can exert more policy control over independent agencies than was previously 
believed, 34 and that the independent commission may not be the best vehicle 
for Congress to influence policy.35 A sensible dialogue between the branches 
· about what each wants to accomplish with these commissions could greatly 
assist the future effectiveness of the administrative agency as an institution. 
The question of administrative agency structure also blends easily into an-
other area where executive-legislative dialogue would be useful-that of the 
delegation of legislative power and the uses of legislative history.36 Vague, 
general grants of power to agencies (independent ones at least) are often 
countered with overly precise statutory requirements for decisionmaking im-
posed upon executive agencies. The practice of writing overly complex and 
detailed legislation is itself a congressional reaction to the fact that the exec-
utive branch has been in the hands of the other party for five of the last six 
administrations. An article in the New York Times outlines numerous 
agency )aws "almost as complex as the tax code," citing the Environmental 
Protection Agency's regulations on air pollution as a prime example, 37 and 
notes: "Bush Administration officials acknowledge that they have missed 
many of the deadlines set by Congress for the new laws. But they say Con-
gress is partly to blame because it writes laws of impenetrable complexity 
with countless mandates and gives Federal agencies insufficient time to write 
needed regulations."38 These problems of legislative complexity, burden-
some time lines, and executive recalcitrance are ideal subjects for informal 
negotiation and compromise. If Congress can understand the agencies's le-
gitimate complaints (on such matters as rulemaking timeframes, for in-
stance), will it not be in a better position to write sensible and more 
enforceable regulatory standards? 
An understanding of how the Executive can best implement congressional 
dictates requires a sharing of experiences on both sides. We need to do what 
Michael Davidson, Counsel, United States Senate, has recently suggested-
34. /d. 
35. Recently congress itself has considered converting one of its independent commis-
sions, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, into an executive, single-headed agency much like 
the Environmental Protection Agency. This willingness on Congress's part to rethink the or-
ganization of agencies in order to make them more effective can only be applauded. /d. at 274-
75. 
36. See generally Symposium, Panel /l Presidential Lawmaking Powers: Vetoes, Line 
Item Vetoes, Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and Delegations of Rulemaking Authority, 
68 WASH U. L.Q. 533 (1990). 
37. Robert Pear, U.S. Laws Delayed by Complex Rules and Partisanship, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 1991, at I. 
38. /d. 
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namely, to find a "common table" for Congress and the White House to 
resolve these matters. 39 
Ill. THE EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES 
Both the executive and legislative branches have institutional mechanisms 
to assist in the resolution of separation of powers disputes. They tend, how-
ever, to be branch-identified and, thereby, to foster the very lack of trust that 
frustrates the resolution of "avoidable" separation of powers disputes. The 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of Justice is the executive 
branch repository of wisdom on separation of powers matters. Long headed 
by astute legal advisors, including two current Supreme Court Justices, this 
office prepares opinions for the Attorney General and mediates ongoing dis-
putes over matters such as document production to Congress. The Office of 
the White House Legal Counsel also works to present the Executive position 
on separation of powers disputes and, when matters reach the court, the 
Solicitor General's office provides the most unbiased perspe:tive of all. But 
none of these Executive institutions has the capacity to serve as effective 
facilitator of interbranch conflict resolution. 
There is, however, an independent agency which has been increasingly 
successful in securing the participation of all three branches in its delibera-
tions. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) exists to 
improve the decision process of the administrative agencies. While its man-
date is limited to matters of procedure, it is one of the few places where 
government brings together members of all three branches for discussion of 
resolutions that can involve settlement of interbranch conflicts.40 
On the congressional side, the institutional arrangements are similar. 
Both the House and Senate have legal counsel who, like the OLC, represent 
their clients well. For longer term research projects the Congressional Re-
search Service (CRS) provides astute reports and expert advice. The execu-
tive branch probably lacks confidence in CRS as an institution, however, 
since its name alone expresses an identification with the congressional 
branch. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) also has similar 
strengths and, after Bowsher v. Synar, it has the comparable weakness of 
being labelled a legislative creature. 
It should not be surprising that the separate branches have created sepa-
rate institutions to advise them. The difficulty is that these branch-identified 
institutions are not constituted to bridge the gap between the branches any 
39. Symposium, supra note 28, at 609. 
40. Indeed the report prepared for ACUS by Peter Shane, see supra notes 21-22, includes 
recommendations for interbranch dialogue. 
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more than are the branches themselves. Institutions that are by inclination 
and organization meant to have single branch loyalties are simply not fo-
cused on the issues of negotiation and compromise of representation of 
proven conflicts. 
There are, of course, several non-governmental organizations that can 
provide less branch-identified settings for research and discussion. The most 
well established is the Brookings Institution (Brookings) which sponsors 
conferences, conducts research, and speaks out on important issues. This is 
perhaps the most effective private organization currently at work in this re-
gard.41 Brookings has regular seminars for senior executive officials, mem-
bers of Congress, and judges that are excellent forums for informal 
discussion.42 Clearly, however, there is room for other organizations that 
can offer neutral settings for discussion of interbranch problems. One can 
conclude this simply by observing that the intensive conflicts described 
above have not been ameliorated by existing mediating institutions. 
IV. NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR RESOLVING INTERBRANCH DISPUTES: 
SETTING THE COMMON TABLE 
The political branches themselves are undoubtedly aware of the desirabil-
ity of resolving disputes in informal ways. The tensions of the last decade 
have made it plain that separation of powers problems are increasingly fric-
tion prone. President Bush has toned down the rhetoric of the Reagan ad-
ministration and made efforts to meet with the leadership in Congress, even 
before the Gulf situation. He of course has more work to do in the after-
math of the Thomas Confirmation. Congress itself also has recognized the 
need for dialogue about the confirmation process. 
Recently, even the House has advocated the creation of new mechanisms 
to help solve the problems of communication. In July 1989, the Committee 
on Legislative Appropriations, chaired by Congressman Vic Fazio, invited 
new ideas for resolving old problems: 
The Committee is concerned about a number of issues the Con-
gress must address involving constitutional process and policy. Is-
sues of this type include impeachment, the budget process, the 
advise and consent role, constitutional amendment procedures, 
war powers, and the legislative veto. Because of this concern, the 
41. Other valuable organizations include the Center for the Study of the Presidency in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, and the Carl Albert Center in Oklahoma. 
42. Brookings does have sOmething of a reputation as a government in exile which con-
ceivably affects its position as a neutral organization. The presence of other organizations such 
as the American Enterprise Institute, and the practice of jointly sponsoring projects between 
them, however, make that a limited concern. 
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Committee believes there is a need to have a central point of analy-
sis and review of matters affecting Congress and the constitutional 
process. . . . [T]he Committee will review this need and consider 
approaches to providing the necessary independent analysis to the 
Congress. 43 
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The importance of responding to these concerns has been recognized by 
several organizations. 44 The Catholic University of America, Columbus 
School of Law, and the College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law, have proposed a collaborative venture-the Center for Inter-
branch Relations and the Constitutional Process. The Center plans to draw 
upon the resources of the combined universities to engage in the following 
activities: 
1. Task forces to examine instances of interbranch conflicts that are sus-
ceptible to effective negotiation. These task forces will involve affili-
ated scholars, students, and government officials. 
2. Seminars and conferences on contentious issues of separate and 
shared powers. What better time, for example, to discuss the future of 
the war powers amendment in light of the Gulf experience and to 
compare it to the experience of Iran-Contra? 
3. Internships for students with members of Congress and the executive 
branch relating to interbranch problems. 
4. Research and data collection in both law school libraries, publication 
of significant findings in the two law schools's law reviews and, as 
appropriate, in the Administrative Law Review which is housed at the 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
5. Provision of a "practice field," a neutral setting for exploring and ne-
gotiating interbranch disputes and settling them, if at all possible, in 
private, rather than in court. This is a prime function of the Center, 
and it cannot come about overnight. It will only happen as the Center 
43. H.R. REP. No. 179, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989). 
44. The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, and the College of 
William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, have joined to establish the Center for 
Interbranch Relations and the Constitutional Process. The Catholic University Center will be 
devoted to helping Congress resolve extraordinary interbranch clashes, such as those that Con-
gressman Fazio described. Congressman Fazio cites several examples of what I have labelled 
here as unavoidable conflicts, but the process of categorization is itself part of the challenge of 
any interbranch dispute resolution center. The Center will serve as a resource center, a source 
for expert testimony, and a setting for consultation with congressional officials. The thrust of 
the William and Mary Center wilJ be long-term research, document collection and retention, a 
conference capacity, and a visiting fellows program. A center with instant access and one that 
offers the opportunity to reflect, provides an ideal environment for quick, as well as educated, 
decisionmaking. 
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gains credibility within the political branches as a forum for neutral 
and objective research. 
In addition, there is an international dimension to the Center's work that 
grows in importance with events that are unfolding in Eastern Europe. Con-
gress has recognized the need to support emerging democracies in Eastern 
Europe through the establishment of its Support for Emerging Eastern Eu-
ropean Democracies (SEED) program. Similarly, the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA) has taken the lead in providing legal advice on 
constitutionalism to the Eastern European countries through its Central and 
East European Law Initiative (CEELI) program. The United States is in a 
unique position to play an important role in shaping the democracies of the 
future. One fascinating element in the constitution drafting that is now oc-
curring is the preoccupation with separation of powers. In countries where 
all functions of the state were in the hands of the Communist leadership, the 
need for offsetting and balancing political branches is fundamental to re-
form. The work of the Center could be invaluable in helping these countries 
understand the significance and limitations of separation of powers in the 
presidential or even parliamentary setting. By working closely with estab-
lished organizations like the ABA, Brookings, the CRS, and other related 
entities, the Center for Interbranch Relations and the Constitutional Process 
can serve a valuable educational function at this critical time in world affairs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
These are ambitious goals for any organization, but especially for a neo-
phyte group. Fortunately, the Center for Interbranch Relations and the 
Constitutional Process benefits greatly from the quality of individuals who 
have agreed to serve as participants and advisers. The Center is capable of 
making a difference in increasing the effectiveness of decisionmaking in our 
national political system, both here and in the creation of new systems 
abroad. Indeed, its research efforts will be of relevance to state governments 
as well. All in all, these are formidable challenges, but the need for a neu-
tral, non-governmental "practice field," where debate between the branches 
can occur without penalty or posturing, has never been greater. 
